We study general equilibrium with nonconvexities. In these economies there exist sunspot equilibria without the usual assumptions needed in convex economies, and they have good welfare properties. Moreover, in these equilibria, agents act as if they have quasi-linear utility. Hence wealth effects vanish. We use this to construct a new model of monetary exchange. As in Lagos-Wright, trade occurs in both centralized and decentralized markets, but while that model requires quasilinearity, we have general preferences. Given our specification looks much like the textbook Arrow-Debreu model, we think this constitutes progress on the classic problem of integrating money and general equilibrium theory. We also use the model to discuss another classic issue: the relation between inflation and unemployment.
Introduction
We study economies with nonconvexities, and in particular with some indivisible goods, with several goals in mind. First, extending Shell and Wright (1993) we show that in the presence of indivisibilities there exist sunspot equilibria without the usual assumptions needed to generate such equilibria in convex economies, and that these equilibria have good welfare properties because sunspots allow convexification similar to the way lotteries work in the indivisible labor economy of Rogerson (1988) . 1 Second, we emphasize something not appreciated in the existing literature on sunspots, lotteries and nonconvexities: in these economies, as long as agents choose interior solutions, in a sense to be made precise, they act as if they have quasi-linear preferences.
It is true that it has been noted previously of the Rogerson model that, when labor is indivisible, under certain additional assumptions that include additive separability between consumption and leisure, agents act as if utility is linear in leisure. But the result is far more general. The fact that for quite general specifications agents act as if they have quasi-linear preferences is useful for a variety of reasons. For one thing, it means that for the divisible goods in the economy, wealth effects vanish. This has many implications, including the law of demand (the demand for each of the divisible goods is unambiguously decreasing in its own price). Here we will emphasize the usefulness of the results for monetary theory, as we now explain. 1 A sunspot equilibrium is one in which extrinsic uncertainty (a random variable with no impact on preferences, endowments, or technologies) affects the allocation. In convex economies, sunspot equilibria are necessarily inefficient, because random allocations are dominated by the average allocation. When some goods are indivisible, however, the average may not be feasible. hence allows one to extend and apply it in a number of ways. 2 Although for some questions one would obviously like to have an endogenous nondegenerate distribution of money holdings, it is useful to have a benchmark without this complication, and to this extent the LW model is interesting. One might object, however, that quasi-linear utility is very special. Our results show that one does not actually need quasi-linearity:
for general preferences, as long as some goods are indivisible, and again given interior solutions, agents act as if they have quasi-linear utility in the sense that they all take the same amount of money out of the centralized market. Thus, we provide an alternative set of assumptions that leads to a very simple model of monetary exchange with explicit microfoundations. 2 LW provide examples and references to other applications. An alternative approach is provided by Shi (1997) ; Faig (2004) tries to integrate the two models, and gives some results related to those derived below. For models that are much less tractable, precisely because one has to keep track of the relevant distribution, see Green and Zhou (1998) , Zhou (1999) , Molico (1999) , Camera and Corbae (1999) , Taber and Wallace (1999) , or Zhu (2003 Zhu ( ,2005 . Earlier search-based models, such as Wright (1989,1993) , Aiyagari and Wallace (1991) , Shi (1995) , or Trejos and Wright (1995) , were also very simple, but only because they avoided the issue by assuming agents could only hold m ∈ {0, 1} units of money.
We make an effort to describe the centralized market in the model in a fairly general way -we have few restrictions on endowments, tastes, or technologies other than those in standard general equilibrium (GE) theory, except that we have some indivisible goods. This generality is adopted because it entails little cost for what we do, and also because it indicates that modern monetary theory is not as special as one might think based on previous presentations. In earlier discussions of the LW model, e.g., the centralized market typically has a single consumption good, consumers are homogeneous in terms of preferences and endowments, firms (if there are firms at all) are homogeneous, and so on. We show that most of these special assumptions are completely unnecessary.
Indeed, our centralized market looks very much like the textbook ArrowDebreu model with state-contingent commodities (Debreu 1959, ch. 7). Thus we can appeal to some standard results in GE. Moreover, given we combine this specification with a micro-based monetary model, one might say that we make a little progress on the classic problem of integrating of money and GE theory. Interestingly, we think, progress here comes not from a Procrustean effort to force money into GE, but from bringing GE into monetary theory.
Finally, under a common interpretation in macro that labor is indivisible, the model generates equilibrium unemployment. 3 And since it is a monetary model, we can use it to discuss another classic issue: the relation between inflation and unemployment. We show that the model generates a longrun Phillips curve that is either upward or downward sloping, depending on preferences, in a simple and natural way. 3 In addition to Rogerson (1988) , a sample of well-known papers in macroeconomics adopting the indivisible labor assumption includes Hansen (1985) , Cooley and Hansen (1989) , and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss indivisibilities and sunspots in GE, without money. We show that agents not at a corner solution act as if they have quasi-linear utility, in the sense that their demands for divisible goods are independent of wealth, and their indirect utility functions are linear in wealth. We also discuss conditions to guarantee interiority. In Section 3 we consider monetary economies. We begin with brief review of LW, then present our alternative model, and compare results. In Section 4 we discuss the relation between inflation and unemployment. In Section 5 we conclude. Some technical results are relegated to the Appendix.
GE with Nonconvexities

Equilibrium: Definition
We begin with a static GE model. 4 There is a measure space (I, Ω, α) of consumers, where I = [0, 1], Ω a σ−algebra of subsets of I, and α the uniform distribution over I. 5 There are K firms indexed by k = 1, ...K.
There are J + 1 commodities: J standard consumption goods indexed by j = 1, ...J, and one indivisible good. We call the indivisible good leisure, following some examples in macro, although this label means little for now. 4 By static, we do not mean the economy is timelss, since as usual one can interpret goods as indexed by dates. We simply mean that there is a single market that convenes before any production and consumption take place. Later we consider sequential-market models. 5 We take this specification from Aumann (1964 Aumann ( ,1966 , who first studied equilibrium with a continuum of agents. We do not actually need a continuum here, but it is adopted because in the monetary models discussed below, as in much of the literature, when combined with random matching it generates anonymity. It is worth mentioning that we could get away with a finite number of agents (for the GE results, and also for the monetary results as long as we have some other way to motivate anonymity) because we use sunspots as opposed to lotteries; the latter generally need the law of large numbers while the former do not (Shell and Wright 1993; Garratt, Keister and Shell 2004) .
By saying leisure is indivisible, we mean that it must either be consumed in a single unit or not at all.
Agent i starts with 1 unit of leisure, and an arbitrary endowment of the other goods e i ∈ R J + , where e i : I → R J + is I−measurable andē = R e i di.
Consumer i has preferences represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U i (c, h), where c ∈ R J + is consumption and h ∈ {0, 1} is labor, which equals 1 minus leisure. The consumption set for each agent is denoted C = R J + ×{0, 1}. We assume U i is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing in c, strictly decreasing in h, and strictly concave. Merely to ease the presentation, we assume U j (c, h) → ∞ as c j → 0 for all j, where U j is the partial derivative with respect to c j , to guarantee c j > 0.
Consumption goods are produced by firms using labor as the only input. Firm k has a technology represented by production function
is output of good j. Assume f k is continuously differentiable, increasing and concave. It is possible that f k j (n k ) = 0 for all n for some j -i.e. each firm k does not necessarily produce every good -but for any good it does produce f k j is strictly increasing and concave. Profit for firm k (defined below) is Π k , and the share of Π k paid to consumer i is η i k ∈ R + where
Consumers are generally heterogenous, but for simplicity we assume there are only a finite number of types T ; that is, I = ∪ T τ =1 I τ , where U i = U τ , e i = e τ and η i k = η τ k for all i ∈ I τ . Also, for simplicity, there is no intrinsic uncertainty: all of the fundamentals are deterministic. However, there is extrinsic uncertainty, represented by the probability space (S, Σ, π), where S = [0, 1] is the set of states representing "sunspot activity," Σ the Borel sets on S, and π the uniform distribution over S. For what we do here, the choice of a uniform distribution is without loss in generality (Garratt, Keister, Qin and Shell 2002) . Although the realization of s ∈ S does not affect preferences, technology or endowments, in principle it could still affect individual's behavior.
Given indivisible goods, having allocations potentially depend on extrinsic uncertainty allows a certain convexification, which can lead to efficiency gains over nonrandomized allocations. 6 Following Shell and Wright (1993), we formalize this by assuming complete Arrow-Debreu markets in sunspotstate-contingent commodities. Thus, the commodity space is the set of π-
+ be the price vector of consumption goods and w(s) ∈ R + the price of labor in state s. 7 For allS ⊂ S, RS p j (s)ds is the cost of a unit of good j if eventS occurs. Let £ c i (s), h i (s) ¤ list a point in commodity space for every consumer i, and £ n k (s) ¤ an employment rule for every firm k.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a list
6 One can define competitive equilibrium without sunspots in the model. By the First Welfare Theorem, which does not require convexity, if it exists such an equilibrium is Pareto optimal within the set of nonrandomized allocations. It is easy to provide robust examples, however, where it is Pareto dominated by randomized allocations, including sunspot equilibrium allocations (see e.g. Shell and Wright 1993). 7 We restrict attention to price systems that have an inner-product representation (see Stokey and Lucas with Prescott 1989, ch.15, e.g., for a discussion).
(ii) given [p(s), w(s)], ∀k n k (s) solves
(iii) ∀s ∈ S, 
Proof. The result follows directly from the strict concavity of f k j in any good j that firm k produces.
Something similar is true for consumers, except that in general we must distinguish between states where they are employed and those where they Proof. Given [p(s), w(s)] = (p, w), we can rewrite the consumer problem
where the maximization is over the sets S i 1 and S i 0 , as well as c i 1 (s), which is consumption in state s ∈ S 1 , and c i 0 (s), which is consumption in state s ∈ S 0 . The result now follows from the strict concavity of U i .
Lemma 2 implies (6) can be reduced to
, where x i = pe i +∆ i is non-labor income or wealth. 9 Clearly, i cares only about the probability with which he works, i = π(S i 1 ), and not about which states are in S i 1 . Also, note that while c i 1 does not equal c i 0 , in general, it does for some specifications. The following result says that if some commodities enter U i separably from h, then the demand for these commodities is the same whether or not i is employed. As a special case, if
Lemma 3 Suppose we can partition
Proof. The result follows directly from strict concavity.
Given Lemmas 1 and 2, we can summarize the decisions of all firms by (n k ) and of all consumers by ¡ c i 1 , c i 0 , i ¢ , which allows us to present a much simpler definition of equilibrium. 10 First, one more piece of notation: let
1 } be the set of agents who are employed, and I 0 (s) = I\I 1 (s) the set who are unemployed, for each state s, where we assume I 1 (s), I 0 (s) ∈ Ω. We need to include I 1 (s) in our list of equilibrium objects because we need to know who is working (and not just the measure of the set of employed agents) in each state.
Definition 2 An equilibrium is now a list
(ii) given (p, w), ∀k n k solves
10 It is simpler mainly because the firm problem has been reduced to choosing n k and the consumer problem to choosing (c Labor demand on the left side of (11) is constant across states; hence so is labor supply on the right side. This means we have to construct I 1 (s) so that the same measure of workers are employed for all s, and the last consistency condition says that we need to do so in such a way that each agent i is working with his chosen probability i . For example, suppose we have homogeneous consumers, so i =¯ for all i. Then in equilibrium P k n k =¯ . We have to construct I 1 (s) so that a fraction¯ of consumers are working in every state, and they are all working in a fraction¯ of the states. This type of construction can be done by generalizing the method in Shell and Wright (1993) . Consider an example with two types of consumers: the set [0, α] are type 1 and wish to work with probability 1 , while the rest are type 2 and wish to work with probability 2 . Set Figure 1 shows as the shaded area pairs (s, i) such that i is employed in state s. Then every consumer is working with the desired probability, and the measure of
However, there is a simpler alternative when we have a continuum of consumers. If type τ want to work with probability τ , in each state s set h τ = 1 with probability τ , and by the law of large numbers a measure τ will be working in each state. 11 
Equilibrium: Properties
Now that we have defined equilibrium, we provide some substantive results.
First note that (11)- (12) can be rewritten after some manipulation as X
This suggests that our economy has a reduced form that looks like a model with no sunspots, where agents simply trade a probability of working i for wages, and use it to buy consumption, in the spirit of lottery models such as Rogerson (1986) .
A particularly simple case is the one where
is separable in h, since then Lemma 3 implies c i 1 = c i 0 = c i . Without loss in generality, set v i (1) = 0 and v i (0) = A > 0. Then the consumer problem can be simplified further to
In this case, it is as if the consumer had a utility function that was linear in i .
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition for any commodity
Hence, in this very special case it is obvious that wealth effects are 0, demand curves slope downward, and the indirect utility function is linear in x i .
We now show these results are general, in the sense that they do not require U i to be separable in h i ; all we need is interiority.
hj /∂x i = 0 ∀i, j, and h = 0, 1.
Proof. Consider the Lagrangian
where λ > 0 is the multiplier, and we leave off the index i where there is no risk of confusion. In the Appendix we show that there is a unique solution to this problem, and assuming ∈ (0, 1) it uniquely satisfies the first-order conditions:
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Notice that x does not appear in (19)- (21) . By the Implicit Function Theorem, these 2J + 1 equations determine (c 1 , c 0 , λ) independently of x, as long
is nonsingular, where H h is the Hessian matrix with (i, j) term U ij (c h , h) and p T is the transpose. By strict concavity of U , |H h | < 0 and so nonsingularity is equivalent to w − pc 1 + pc 0 6 = 0.
In the above result we rule out the possibility w − pc 1 + pc 0 = 0, which is equivalent to U (c 1 , 1) = U (c 0 , 0) by (21) . It is well known that this possibility arises for a very special utility function in the case of 1 good, 
Hence in this case U (c 1 , 1) = U (c 0 , 0) and (21) implies w−pc 1 +pc 0 = 0. Now we cannot solve (19)- (21) for (c 1 , c 0 , λ) independently of x. Indeed, (22) now implies pc 0 = x. However, now (19)- (20) tell us that, for j 6 = J, we
12 See e.g. Cooper (1987) 14 We can solve these for c
Now we can conclude two things. First, normalizing p J = 1 with no loss in generality,
which says that w must be a particular function of p; this is nongeneric in partial equilibrium, but can easily occur in general equilibrium. 13 Second,
in this case it is c 0J that adjusts with x to satisfy the budget equation, and all other variables are independent of x.
Given that we have explained how to handle the above special case, to conserve space, from now on we ignore it and simply assume that w − pc i 1 + pc i 0 6 = 0.
Proposition 2 Under the conditions in Proposition 1, ∂c i hj /∂p j < 0 ∀i, j and h = 0, 1.
Proof. Exercise.
Proposition 3 Under the conditions in Proposition 1, ∂W
independent of x i . 13 Suppose that consumers are homogeneous, J = 1, and there is a representative firm with f 0 (0) = ∞ and f 0 (1) = 0. Then = n ∈ (0, 1) in equilibrium so w will adjust to satisfy the relevant condition, which with J = 1 is w/p = v(0) − v(1). That is, the real wage exactly compensates workers for lost leisure.
Proof. We can rearrange (18) as
By (21) , the term in brackets vanishes. From Proposition 1, c 0 and λ are independent of x, and the result follows.
We now provide something along the lines of an aggregation theorem.
First, start with an economy where consumers have homogeneous preferences and wealth, and consider any equilibrium. Now change the distribution of wealth. Then there is an equilibrium where prices and individual consumption are exactly the same as in the homogeneous-wealth economy, and although individual employment probabilities may be different, aggregate employment is the same. The only requirement is interiority for i . As we discuss at the end of this section, this can be guaranteed in a homogeneouswealth economy with certain assumptions on technology. Given interiority for a homogeneous-wealth economy, we can then guarantee interiority with heterogeneous wealth by putting bounds on the extent of the wealth heterogeneity.
Proposition 4 Assume
be an equilibrium when x i =x ∀i, satisfying the conditions in Proposition 1. Give each consumer i a transfer t i in units of the numeraire good, so that x i =x + t i , where
Then there exist x > 0 and x < x, constructed in the proof, with the following property: if x i ∈ (x, x) ∀i, then an equilibrium exists with i ∈ (0, 1) ∀i and it has the same (p,ŵ) and
Proof. In the homogeneous-wealth economy, from the budget equation,
by assumption. Now consider the economy with transfers, and set (p, w) =
Integrating across agents, R I i di =ˆ . Since all aggregate quantities are the same, markets clear.
It remains to give conditions on the distribution such that i ∈ (0, 1) ∀i.
Note that in both cases x > 0 and x < x. As long as x i ∈ (x, x) ∀i, then i ∈ (0, 1) for all i. Note that x i ∈ (x, x) ∀i is possible becausex ∈ (x, x) by (24) . This completes the proof.
In fact, it is easy to generalize Proposition 4 so that it holds without the assumption of homogeneous preferences.
Corollary 1 Suppose there are T consumer types, with U i = U τ for all i ∈ I τ , where ∪ T τ =1 I τ = I. Suppose there is an equilibrium when x i =x τ ∀i ∈ I τ satisfying the conditions in Proposition 1. Give each consumer i a transfer t i so that now x i =x τ + t i , where R I τ t i di = 0 ∀τ . Then there exist
x τ > 0 and x τ < x τ with the following property: if x i ∈ (x τ , x τ ) ∀i ∈ I τ , ∀τ , then an equilibrium exists with i ∈ (0, 1) ∀i and it has the same prices, the same consumption, and the same total employment for every type.
These results say that, as long as it is not too disperse, the wealth distribution does not matter for consumption or aggregate employment. When wealth differs across agents, rich agents will work less and poor agents more, but nothing else changes. This is useful in the monetary economy studied below, where it implies that even if agents enter the market with different amounts of money, they exit with the same. To preview how this works, we present an example where we put money in the utility function -although we want to make it perfectly clear that we commit this sin here only for purposes of illustration, and in the next section the value of money is derived from first principles. U is separable in h, we know c 0 = c 1 = c andm 0 =m 1 =m. Hence the 14 The fact this production function is not strictly concave does violate assumptions made above, but this causes no problems, since we can solve the example explicitly.
consumer problem is
Substituting for from the budget constraint at equality, 
after inserting market clearing,m = M , and p = A/BV 0 (M ). Clearly, is decreasing in m, and ∈ (0, 1) iff m ∈ (m, m), where
The previous example assumes separability in h. Suppose instead that U (c,m, h) = c a (1+b−h) 1−a +V (m), where 0 < a < 1 and 0 < b < (1−a)/a. Now we do not have c 0 = c 1 , although we still havem 0 =m 1 =m. The consumer problem is
This time, we substitute form and take the first-order conditions: 
after insertingm = M and p. Hence, ∈ (0, 1) iff m ∈ (m, m), where
As one can see, it is easy to solve examples, and to construct (m, m) explicitly.
Equilibrium: Existence.
We close this section with a discussion of existence in the general model.
Define excess demand for labor and goods by
We claim the following is true: (i) As we show in the Appendix, even though W i is not strictly quasi-concave, there is a unique solution to the consumer problem (c i 1 , c i 0 , i ) and it is a continuous function of (p, w). It is clear on the firm side, profit maximization determines n k as a continuous function of (p, w). Hence, excess demand is a continuous function of (p, w). Of course, existence does not guarantee i ∈ (0, 1) for all i. Since many of our results about the properties of equilibrium depend on it, it would be good to have some additional conditions to guarantee interiority. One way one might imagine proceeding is to put curvature restrictions on technology.
Thus, if we assume that for at least one firm k and good j, ∂f k j (n)/∂n → ∞ as n → 0, then clearly aggregate labor demand satisfies = P k n k > 0 in any equilibrium. And if we assume that for every firm k and good j, ∂f k j (n)/∂n → 0 as n →n k where P kn k ≤ 1, then = P k n k < 1 in any equilibrium. However, this assumption would contradict property (v) that we used for existence. Therefore, we take a different route. ∀i, as long as wealth is not too heterogeneous.
One could generalize this logic to J goods as follows. Definê
where p is a solution to c 1 = f (1) + e. Define next
To guarantee that n = 1 is not an equilibrium we can imposeŴ (c, 1) < W (c, 0) for any p such that c 1 = f (1) + e. This simply requires that pf 0 (1)
is not too big.
Monetary Theory
The LW Model
We begin with a review of LW, to provide the basic environment, notation, etc. There is a [0, 1] continuum of infinite-lived agents. Time is discrete, and each period is divided into two subperiods. In the first subperiod there is a frictionless centralized market CM. In the second subperiod there is a decentralized market DM with two main frictions: a double-coincidence problem detailed below, and anonymity, which precludes private credit arrangements.
These frictions make money essential. 15 15 See Kocherlakota (1998) and Wallace (2001) for formal discussions of essentiality, especially the role of anonymity. We also emphasize that it is not important for the CM and DM to meet sequentially; versions where they meet simultaneously, but agents cannot be at both places at the same time, are developed by Williamson (2005) 
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There is a single consumption good c in the CM. Agents have 0 endowment of this good, but can produce it with technology c = h. Assume for now that agents can only make spot trades in the CM -i.e. they cannot move resources across periods except by carrying money between markets -but we argue below that this is really without loss of generality. In the DM there is also one good q. Each agent faces the following possibilities in the DM: with probability σ ≤ 1/2 he wants to consume and derives utility u(q); with the same probability he has the ability to produce at disutility cost ψ(q); and with probability 1 − 2σ he neither wants to consume nor can produce. Agents who want to consume and those who can produce meet bilaterally and anonymously in the DM, where they trade using money. 16 Let q * be the quantity that solves u 0 (q) = ψ 0 (q); this is an important benchmark because it is what a planner would choose -i.e. it is the efficient DM production. Agents discount between the CM and DM at rate β 1 , and between the DM and the next CM at rate β 2 . Let β = β 1 β 2 . There is a stock by the solution to β 2m /p +1 = g(q) with
We go into more detail on bargaining in the next subsection, where the derivation of (31) will be clear; for now we simply note that it is the price in the next CM, p +1 , that is relevant for q in this DM. 18 Given these results, 17 There are two caveats: the distribution of m across agents in the CM cannot be too disperse, since we need interior solutions; and one has to check that V is strictly concave. LW give assumptions on primitives to guarantee both. 18 Note that (31) is the solution for m only below a threshold m * , while for m ≥ m * we have (d, q) = (m * , q * ); LW prove that m < m * in any equilibrium, so we can ignore this detail. Also note that LW consider only the case β 2 = 1, but this is not crucial. the DM value function satisfies
The model is solved as follows. Given quasi-linearity, say U = u(c) − h, substitute h from the CM budget equation into W , and take the first-order condition with respect tom:
The envelope condition from (32) 
Or, since q 0 (m) = β 2 /p +1 g 0 (q) from the bargaining solution,
Combining (33) and (34), we have
Finally, the bargaining solution implies 1/p +1 = g(q)/β 2 M (1 + γ) and (lag-
Given a sequence for γ, any strictly positive and bounded solution to this difference equation in q constitutes a monetary equilibrium 19 If γ is constant, it makes sense to consider a steady state where all real variables, including q, are constant. Then the inflation rate is γ, the real interest rate is ρ defined by β = 1/(1 + ρ), and the nominal interest rate is i = (1 + ρ)(1 + γ) − 1.
Now (36) reduces to
This is the basic model. 20 We close this section by arguing that, in any equilibrium, the assumption of only spot trades in the CM is not restrictive. m, b) . Hence, all agents choose the same portfolio, and the market clears atb = 0. Therefore, we can shut down these asset markets. 20 We do not dwell on substantive results here, except to mention the following. Under standard assumptions, a monetary equilibrium exists iff i ≥ 0. For i > 0, q < q * , so equilibrium is inefficient. Welfare is maximized at the Friedman Rule, i = 0, but if θ < 1 then we have q < q * even at i = 0.
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A New Model
We now consider a model similar to LW, except for two main differences:
instead of quasi-linearity, we allow a general utility function; and we assume indivisible labor. We also introduce some other extensions, such a general vector of consumption goods c, an arbitrary endowment e that may differ over time, profit-maximizing firms, and so on, but we continue to assume homogeneous preferences for now:
The key assumption is indivisible labor, and given this, we consider sunspot equilibria. As in the previous section, we assume only spot trades, but argue below that this is again without loss in generality.
In terms of state-contingent commodities, the CM consumer problem is
This is formally equivalent to the consumer problem in Definition 1, even though money is not a standard commodity here. 21 Hence we can focus on
for all s such that h i (s) = 0 by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Also, givenm i and h i enter separably, we knowm i 1 =m i 0 =m i by Lemma 3. Therefore the problem reduces to
One detail is that one has to show V i is well behaved -in particular, strictly concave -which can be done following the methods in LW. where x i = pe i +m i +γM +∆ i . Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions are:
Observe that (38)-(40) constitute 2J + 1 equations in 2J + 1 unknowns.
Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, and in particular w−pc i 1 +pc i 0 6 = 0, these equations can be solved for (c i 1 , c i 0 , λ i ) independently ofm i and i , as a function of (p, w) but not x i . Because the only way consumers differ here is with respect to 
Proof. Consider W i (x). We have
The first term vanishes by (40), so ∂W i /∂x i = λ, which is independent of i and x i . We show the other result below, after we have described V i in more detail; see (47).
We formalize the analysis of the first-order conditions up to this point as follows.
Lemma 5 Under the assumptions of Proposition 1, we have
Proof. Follows from the discussion in the text.
so i is linearly decreasing in x i and hence m i . But aggregate labor supplȳ
depends only on average real wealth, pē +∆. This means that aggregate demand for the J consumption goods,
does not depend on the wealth distribution, or on monetary considerations at all.
On the firm side, profit maximization determines n k as a function of (p, w). We can now define market clearing by:
There are J + 2 equations and we only determine J + 1 prices (p, w), as we have already normalized the price of money to 1. 22 Existence of a solution to (45), which can be considered a "spot market equilibrium" or an equilibrium in the CM, taking V i as given and well behaved, is established exactly as in Proposition 5. Additionally, notice that the CM equilibrium is determined independently of the value of q, which does not appear in the above equations: the model displays a neoclassical dichotomy (see Aruoba and Wright 2003). One implication of this is that monetary policy does not affect the CM, as we discuss further below. 23 To determine properties of V i we now proceed to the DM, beginning with bargaining. Again we use the generalized Nash solution. Consider a meeting between agents i and i 0 where the former is the consumer and the latter the producer. For the consumer, his payoff is
is his wealth in the next CM if he does not trade. For the producer, his payoff
+1 and W i 0 +1 both have slope λ +1 by Lemma 4, where λ +1 is the same for all consumers, the bargaining solution reduces to
One can show that in any equilibrium the constraint holds with equality, exactly as in LW. Substituting d =m i into (46), the first-order condition with respect to q is
This can be rearranged into β 2m i λ +1 = g(q), where g(·) is exactly the same as (31) above. Sincem i = M +1 for all i, in equilibrium, q = q(M +1 ) is the same in every trade. The DM value function satisfies
can differ across individuals. However, as claimed in Lemma 4, the derivative
does not depend on i, where we get q 0 (m i ) = β 2 λ +1 u 0 (q)/g 0 (q) from the bargaining solution. Inserting (47) into (41), we have
Using β 2m i λ +1 = g(q), and market clearingm i = M (1 + γ), (48) becomes
Observe that (49) is identical to (36). Hence, in terms of the DM, the new model has exactly the same predictions as LW. Of course the CM differs across the two models, because very different commodities are being traded (and in particular, the new model generates equilibrium unemployment, as we discuss in the next section). Still, it is the case that the assumption of only spot trades in the CM is without loss in generality here. This is perhaps less clear here because, e.g., we have arbitrary endowments across agents, so one might think they would want to borrow or lend; but as long as they are at an interior solution, they would just as soon increase or decrease i , and again asset markets are not needed.
Before closing this section, we discuss the maintained assumption i ∈ 
As in the proof of Proposition 4 there are two cases:
For brevity we present only the former case. 24 Then, for a given i, (50) implies:
Or, to put this in real terms, use the bargaining solution to eliminate M = g(q −1 )/β 2 λ and rearrange to get: 
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is easy to see that g is increasing and q < q * at every date in any equilibrium, where u 0 (q * ) = ψ 0 (q * ), exactly as in LW. Hence it is easy to impose conditions that guarantee interiority. 25 We summarize the results as follows:
Proposition 6 In the model of this section, i ∈ (0, 1) ∀i as long as g(q * ) < min
∀i, where Γ i 1 and Γ i 2 are defined in (53) and (54). Given this, the equilibrium q sequence satisfies (49), which is exactly the same as the LW model.
The Phillips Curve
The basic version of the LW model dichotomizes: as discussed above, one can solve for the allocations in the CM and DM independently. A consequence of this is that money does not affect aggregate production or consumption in the CM, although it does affect real output since q is a real variable. In particular, the fraction of agents who are unemployed, 1 −¯ , is independent of the money growth rate, γ, and therefore the long-run Phillips curve is vertical. 26 There are various ways to get around the dichotomy. For instance Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2005) discuss how to proceed by generalizing the technology. Here we proceed by generalizing preferences. A key assumption in the previous section is that utility is additively separable be- 25 Intuitively, we need to have the DM not too important, in the sense that q is not too big, because otherwise the value of money is too high and this either forces some people to = 1 (those with no money trying to aquirem), or forces some people to = 0 (those with lots of money trying to spend down tom). 26 To be accurate, money does affect the distribution of i across agents entering the CM with different m i , as indicated by (43); but it has no effect on aggregate employment .
tween the CM and DM. We now assume the utility of consumption in the DM is u (q, c, h) . To ease the presentation, we assume there is only one CM consumption good c, that the endowment of c is 0, that β 1 = 1, and that the CM technology is c = Bh, so the real wage is B and x i = m i + γM.
Also, we write CM utility as simply −v(h), with v(1) = A and v(0) = 0, without is without loss in generality since we already have c in u(q, c, h). 27 As we did earlier, we use m i as the CM state variable. The CM problem in terms of state-contingent commodities is
where we have left off the superscript i to save space, but otherwise the only innovation is that (m, c, h) is the state variable for V , since these are all relevant but predetermined for the DM. The usual logic reduces this problem to
First-order conditions for an interior solution are:
: 27 One interpretation is that the CM good c is purchased in the first subperiod but only consumed in the second, after participating in the DM.
Given V , (55)-(57) constitute 5 equations that determine (c 1 , c 0 ,m 1 ,m 0 , λp) , independently of or m; then (58) determines . Notice that we do not get a degenerate distribution, but a two point distribution, of money holdings, since in generalm 1 6 =m 0 . Also, notice that W 0 = λ. We still have work ahead of us, however, since we still have to analyze V . 28 We begin with bargaining. Consider a match where the buyer has some arbitrary (m, c, h) and the seller (m,c,h). Since W 0 +1 = λ +1 , generalizing the analysis in the previous section, the generalized Nash solution is
Notice the only placem enters the problem is through the constraint, and (m,c,h) does not enter the problem at all. As before, the constraint d ≤m must bind, and the first-order condition with respect to q is:
This can be rewritten βλ +1m = g(q, c, h), where
In general, q = q(m, c h , h) depends on the buyer's entire state vector, although when θ = 1, g(q, c, h) = ψ(q) and q depends only onm. In any case, there are two values of q h = q(m h , c h , h), in equilibrium, corresponding to h = 1, 0 (consumers who were employed and unemployed). 28 In the previous section we could say a lot about the CM equilibium even before analyzing V because the model dichotomized: recall that we could solve (38)- (40) for
The whole point of this section is to study cases that do not dichotomize.
Given this,
where the expectation in the second term is over q and d, which now depend for producers on the type of consumer they meet. Thus,
where
takes into account the effect of c on q in bargaining. If θ = 1, however, producers get 0 surplus from trade, so this effect vanishes and
Using (59)- (61) to eliminate V and the bargaining solution to eliminatê m h , (55)-(57) become:
At this stage we look for a steady state where all real variables including pλ are constant, which implies λ/λ +1 = 1 + γ. 29 Then the above system simplifies to:
Then aggregate employment is
Finally, inserting the bargaining solution βλ +1mh = g(q h , c h , h) into¯ m 1 +
(1 −¯ )m 0 = M (1 + γ), we can solve for the marginal value of money
which pins down the nominal price level p, given we already solved for pλ. It is obvious that this system does not dichotomize, and hence money affects the CM allocation (c 1 , c 0 ,¯ ). Consider the case θ = 1. Then g(q, h) = ψ(q), and it is easy to show that g(q 1 , 1) < g(q 0 , 0) iff q 1 < q 0 iff u qh < 0. ∂(1 −¯ )/∂i w u qh . Moreover,
These results are also extremely intuitive. Inflation reduces q. Then if u qh > 0 (q and h are complements, or q and leisure are substitutes) this increases leisure and hence reduces¯ . But if u cq < 0 (q and leisure are complements) then inflation reduces leisure and hence increases¯ .
Proposition 8 When u(q, c, h) = u(q, h) and θ = 1 the model has a longrun relation between inflation and unemployment that slopes down iff u qh < 0.
Conclusion
We have presented a framework within which one can analyze general equilibrium with nonconvexities like indivisible labor (although the analysis also applies to other nonconvexities). In nonconvex economies, randomization can be desirable, and we showed how to support random allocations as equilibria using extrinsic uncertainty, or sunspots. These equilibria have certain interesting and convenient properties, perhaps especially the property that agents act as if they have quasi-linear utility. This means that, assuming interiority, we have zero wealth effects, and so the law of demand must hold, for all of the divisible goods. Also, we can do aggregation, in the sense that within limits the distribution of wealth does not matter.
We then applied the results to monetary economics. We presented an alternative to the framework in Lagos and Wright (2005) -an alternative that generates similar results, but is based on indivisible labor and general utility, rather than quasi-linearity utility. We presented our assumptions in a fairly general way, trying to provide a less restrictive model than in previous related work in monetary economics. Finally, we showed that the model, because it is a monetary model that generates equilibrium unemployment, can be used to discuss the Phillips curve. We think the exercise has taught us a lot about equilibrium models with nonconvexities, and about monetary economics, and we hope that the results will also be useful to others.
(−1) J+j−1 . Therefore any point that satisfies the first-order conditions is a strict local maximum. ¥
Appendix 2. Global maximum
Here we use the results in Appendix 1 to show that a solution to the firstorder conditions constitutes the global maximum. We begin by breaking the problem into two steps. First define 
